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  11. Introduction 
 
The choice of an appropriate exchange rate regime has been at the core of 
economic policy debate since the Asian currency crisis, because the soft-peg exchange 
rates of East Asian currencies have been blamed for inviting crises. A number of 
relatively fixed-rate countries have been forced to abandon their pegs and bands. 
Accordingly, the so-called bi-polar view―greater flexibility (free floating) or credible 
institutional assurance (hard pegs such as currency board or dollarization)―is gaining 
wide support (Fischer 2001; Mussa et al. 2000). A general consensus is that as long as 
developing countries maintain open capital accounts, they can choose only either a hard 
peg and a passive monetary policy, or a flexible exchange rate and an independent 
monetary policy (Frankel, 1999).
1
  The recent transition of exchange rate arrangements, based on what government 
of each country claims (“de jure”), appears to confirm the bi-polar view as many 
countries move to the bi-polar regimes. However, as suggested by Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002), what government of each country claims is often different from what they 
actually do (“de facto”).  Many developing countries claiming that they adopt de jure free 
floating exchange rate regimes have attempted to reduce exchange rate fluctuations 
through foreign exchange interventions (i.e., in the case of Korea, see Park et al., 2001). 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) call this “Fear of Floating” in their explanation of why 
exchange rate rigidity is conspicuous in the case of developing countries.  
The East Asian countries experienced one of the most devastating crises in the 
                                                      
1 This alleged incompatibility of a hard peg, an open capital account, and an independent monetary policy 
is known as the “Impossible Trinity Hypothesis.” 
  2world economic history. These countries are well known to have adopted a soft peg when 
the Asian crisis occurred. Many East Asian countries claimed to have a free-floating 
regime with free capital mobility. However, most East Asian countries, except for a few 
that feel comfortable with a hard peg, might not be fearless floaters. Some recent 
observers, such as Mussa (2000) have noted that after the crises, several countries 
returned to the exchange rate policy similar to that in the pre-crisis period. They argue 
that reverting to the old exchange rate policy may make these countries vulnerable to 
another crisis. 
  This paper examines the exchange rate arrangements in the East Asian countries 
during the post-crisis period and investigate how the exchange rate arrangements have 
changed in the post-crisis period, in particular, whether the exchange rate arrangements in 
the post-crisis period are reverting to those in the pre-crisis period, and whether the 
exchange rate arrangements in the post-crisis are close to a free float. More generally, we 
evaluate the “Fear of Floating” in the post-crisis exchange rate arrangements of East 
Asian countries, whether the bi-polar view is empirically supported in the East Asian 
countries, and which hypothesis, “Fear of Floating” or the bi-polar view, is a more 
compelling description of exchange rate arrangements in East Asia.
2
  To investigate the de facto exchange rate arrangements in the East Asian countries, 
we first apply the methodology developed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), which basically 
exploits the volatility of the exchange rate and policy instruments (such as foreign 
reserves and interest rate). Then, we apply the methodology revised by Kim (2004), 
which uses structural VAR models to infer the explicit policy reaction functions. Kim’s 
                                                      
2 See Kim (2004) for a study on more samples of countries including non-Asian countries. 
  3method resolves some shortcomings in the Calvo and Reinhart’s measure, in particular 
the endogeneity of the policy variables.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the empirical 
methodologies developed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Kim (2004) for identifying 
de facto exchange rate arrangements. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical 




In order to identify de facto exchange rate arrangements, Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) and many subsequent studies such as Baig (2001), Hernandez and Montiel (2003), 
and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), rely on the volatility of exchange rate changes 
(in percentage) and policy instruments changes such as interest rate changes and foreign 
exchange reserve changes (in percentage).
3  If the policy authority actively stabilizes the 
exchange rate movements by adjusting the policy instruments, the exchange rate 
movements would be small while the policy instrument movements would be large. In a 
fixed exchange rate regime, the volatility of the exchange rate changes would be very 
small but that of policy instruments would be very high since the policy authority would 
actively use its policy instruments to intervene in the foreign exchange market and fix the 
exchange rate. On the other hand, in a free float system, the volatility of the exchange rate 
changes would be high but that of the policy instruments would be small since the policy 
authority would rarely use its policy instrument and exchange rate movements would not 
                                                      
3 Rogoff and Reinhart (2002) develop a novel system of re-classifying exchange rate regime, based on the 
market determined exchange rates. 
  4be much stabilized. Based on this idea, past studies often classified the regime with 
smaller exchange rate changes and larger policy instruments changes as a less flexible 
exchange rate arrangement and the regime with larger exchange rate changes and smaller 
policy instrument changes as a more flexible exchange rate arrangement. 
To measure the volatility of changes in each variable, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
used the probability that the absolute value of the percentage changes in each variable is 
higher (or lower) than some threshold values. As discussed by Calvo and Reinhart (2002), 
the probability measure is better than other volatility measures such as the variance of 
each variable changes, because it avoids the problem of outliers that can distort variances. 
Following Calvo and Reinhart (2002), we use the probability measures with 1% and 2.5% 
as threshold values. We calculate the probabilities that percentage changes in the 
exchange rate, percentage changes in the foreign exchange reserves, and changes in the 
interest rate are smaller than the threshold values.  
  In addition to the probability measures, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) constructed an 
exchange rate flexibility index. The index is defined as the ratio of variance of the 
percentage changes in exchange rate to the sum of variance of the percentage change in 
foreign exchange reserves and the change in interest rate. This index calculates the ratio 
of the volatility of the exchange rate to the volatility of the policy instruments. A higher 
number is observed when the exchange rate is relatively more volatile than the policy 
instruments. Therefore, a higher number suggests a more flexible exchange rate 
arrangement. We use this exchange rate flexibility index to infer the exchange rate 
arrangements in the East Asian countries. 
Calvo and Reinhart’s measures are intuitively appealing, but their method has 
  5some drawbacks. The policy instruments may change in the absence of the policy 
authority’s intention to stabilize the exchange rate. Foreign exchange reserves may 
change owing to fluctuations in valuation and the accrual of interest earnings. Interest 
rate may change as the policy authority pursues other policy objectives than the exchange 
rate stabilization. In turn, this change in policy instruments would affect the exchange 
rate and generate some extra volatility in the exchange rate. Such changes in policy 
instruments and the exchange rate should be excluded in inferring de facto exchange rate 
arrangements since they may not be related to the exchange rate stabilization. However, 
Calvo and Reinhart (2002)’s measures do not. This problem arises from using 
unconditional data that comprises both the movements originated from shocks to the 
exchange rate (that policy instruments react to) and the movements originated from 
shocks to the instruments (that affect the exchange rate), although only the former 
contains the relevant information.  
To separate the two types of shocks, Kim (2004) imposes sign restrictions on 
impulse responses. The two types of shocks imply different sign restrictions on the 
exchange rate and the policy instruments. For example, an exchange rate depreciation 
would lead to a decrease in the foreign exchange reserves (or an increase in the interest 
rate) when the policy authority stabilizes the exchange rate, while a decrease in the 
foreign exchange reserves (or an increase in the interest rate) would lead to an exchange 
rate appreciation. Based on the estimated impulse responses to the shocks to the exchange 
rate, Kim (2004) formally recovers dynamic policy reaction functions, which describe the 
exchange rate stabilization policy, and infer the exchange rate arrangement in each 
country.  Detailed methodology can be summarized as follows.  
  6Two variable VAR models, which can be easily estimated over a short sample, 
are constructed. Each model includes the percentage changes in the exchange rate and a 
policy instrument; one model includes the percentage changes in the foreign exchange 
reserves as the policy instrument while the other model includes the changes in the 
interest rate. As usual in structural VAR analysis, the structural form representation is 
identified from the estimated reduced form representation by imposing some restrictions. 
For the first model, the two variable reduced form VAR equations are: 
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where E is the log of the exchange rate, FR is the log of foreign exchange reserves, A(L)’s 
are polynomials in lag operator L, εE and εFR are the residuals in each equation, ε is 2 by 1 
vector of residuals, that is, ε = (εE  εFR)’, and var(ε)=Σ. For simplicity, the constant term 
in equation (1) is dropped. 
To identify the (structural) shocks to the exchange rate (that foreign exchange 
reserves reacts to stabilize the exchange rate) and the (structural) shocks to foreign 
exchange reserves (that affects the exchange rate), sign restrictions on impulse responses 
are imposed. First, a positive shock to foreign exchange reserves would lead to an 
exchange rate depreciation (or an increase in the exchange rate); buying foreign currency, 
selling domestic currency and building up foreign exchange reserves would lead to 
exchange rate depreciation. Second, a positive shock to the exchange rate (or exchange 
rate depreciation) would lead to a decrease in the foreign exchange reserves when the 
policy authority stabilizes the exchange rate since a decrease in the foreign exchange 
  7reserves would appreciate the exchange rate and offset the initial depreciation. That is, we 
define the shocks that move the two variables in the same direction as the structural 
shocks to the foreign exchange reserves (that affects the exchange rate) and the shocks 
that move the two variables in opposite directions as the structural shocks to the exchange 
rate (that foreign exchange reserves react to). To implement such identification, we 
modify the sign-restriction method developed by Uhlig (1999).
4
The resulting structural form equations are: 
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where B0’s are constants, B(L)’s are polynomials in lag operator L, eE and eFR are the 
structural shock to the exchange rate and the structural shocks to foreign exchange 
reserves, respectively, e is two by one vector of structural shocks, that is, e = (eE,  eFR)’, 
var(e)=Ω, and Ω is a diagonal matrix. The sign restrictions on impulse responses give 
some sign restrictions on contemporaneous structural parameters, B11 (0) ≥ 0, B12 (0) ≥ 0, 
B21 (0) ≤ 0 , and B22 (0) ≥ 0 . Such restrictions on the contemporaneous structural 
parameters B are natural. We can interpret the first equation as the foreign exchange 
market equation and the second equation as the policy reaction function. The implications 
for the restrictions are: the policy authority decreases the foreign exchange reserves in 
reaction to the exchange rate depreciation in order to stabilize the exchange rate while an 
                                                      
4 We impose such restrictions only on the impact responses since it is more difficult to justify the signs of 
the lagged responses. For example, a positive foreign exchange reserve shock depreciates the exchange rate. 
Next period, the foreign exchange reserve might decrease if the policy authority tries to offset the exchange 
rate depreciation. 
  8increase in the foreign exchange reserves depreciates the exchange rate in the foreign 
exchange market. 
To infer the degree of stabilization, we can interpret the coefficients on the 
foreign exchange policy reaction function (equation (2)). That is,  
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Equation (3) has both the exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve on the right hand 
side, so the interpretation is complicated. Therefore, equation (3) can be rewritten as: 
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By tracing coefficients on ∆Et, ∆Et-1, ∆Et-2,… in equation (4), we can examine how many 
percentages the foreign exchange reserves changes over time in reaction to 1 percentage 
depreciation of the exchange rate.
5  In practice, such dynamic policy reaction function in 
this two variable model can be obtained by combining the impulse responses of the 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserves to the shocks to the exchange rate.
6  
  To infer the interest rate reactions to the exchange rate, we also construct a two 
variable model that includes the log of exchange rate changes and the interest rate 
changes. For the interest rate, we use the difference form, following Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002). In the model that the interest rate changes, instead of the log of foreign exchange 
reserve changes, are included, we impose the restriction that a positive shock to the 
                                                      
5 Refer to Kim (2002) and Kim (2003) for such ways of recovering policy reaction functions. 
6 See Kim (2004) for details. 
  9interest rate decreases the exchange rate (since an increase in the interest rate makes the 
domestic currency asset more attractive), while a positive shock to the exchange rate 
increases the interest rate (since the policy authority tries to stabilize the exchange rate). 
  Although we constructed two variable models that include only one policy 
instrument, we also expect that there are some interactions between two policy 
instruments. To consider interactions between two policy instruments, a three variable 
model that includes both policy instruments is needed. In this regard, Kim (2004) 
constructed a three variable model that includes both policy instruments, and found that 
the results are qualitatively similar.  
 
3. Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asian Countries 
 
3.1. De Jure Classification 
Table 1 shows the de jure exchange rate regime of nine East Asian countries 
reported in IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. Among them five 
countries experienced severe crisis in 1997: Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, 
and Thailand. Except for the Philippines, these countries reported changes in the 
exchange rate arrangements during the crisis. Out of total nine East Asian countries in our 
sample, five countries changed the exchange rate arrangements during the Asian crisis. 
Three countries (Korea, Indonesia and Thailand) changed from intermediate regimes like 
managed float to a free floating. China moved from managed floating to a peg.
7 Malaysia 
                                                      
7 This is based on IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. However, moving out of a 
dual exchange rate system, Chinese exchange rate was fixed in 1994 (US$1 = 8.72 RMB). In 1994, the 
official exchange rate and market swap rate were merged to a single rate. During the two years between 
  10changed from a managed float to a peg with capital controls in September 1998. Although 
Indonesia and Thailand reverted back to a managed float, the bi-polar view has some 
supports based on the de jure regime classification. However, each country may behave 
differently from what they say as suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). In the next 
section, de facto exchange rate arrangements are inferred from the data by applying the 
methods discussed in Section 2. 
 
3.2. De Facto Exchange Rate Arrangements: Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
In order to infer de facto exchange rate arrangements, we first apply Calvo and 
Reinhart’s methods. Their method is primarily based on the volatility of exchange rate 
and policy instruments. Therefore, we first plot the exchange rate and policy instruments 
of East Asian countries to see the visual difference in the two variables across the 
countries and between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Figure 1 shows the log of the exchange rate of the East Asian countries (and 
Australia as a benchmark for a free floater) against U.S. dollar from 1992 to 2003 in 
which the value of December 2003 is normalized to 100. Exchange rate becomes less 
volatile for China and Malaysia that announced a fixed exchange rate regime. The 
exchange rate in Hong Kong over the whole sample period is almost fixed, to be 
consistent with its claim. On the other hand, in three countries that announced a free float 
during the crisis (Korea, Indonesia and Thailand), the exchange rates tend to be more 
volatile after the crisis, to be consistent with their claim of adopting a more flexible 
exchange rate regime. Also in the Philippines and Singapore, the exchange rate becomes 
                                                                                                                                                              
August 1995 and end-1997, the value of the RMB (Renminbi) rose by 5 percent, but since the Asian crisis, 
the rate has been actually pegged to  8.27 RMB to the U.S. dollar. 
  11more volatile after the crisis, although they did not report any changes in the exchange 
rate regime. Overall, the exchange rate movements are not inconsistent with the transition 
in de jure exchange rate arrangements. 
Figure 2 shows the foreign exchange reserves (in terms of US dollar) in which 
the value of December 2003 is normalized to 100. In Korea and Indonesia, the foreign 
exchange reserves tend to be less volatile in the post crisis period than they were in the 
pre crisis period, while they tend to be more volatile in Singapore and Thailand. Figure 3 
reports the interest rate. In Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, the interest rate 
tends to be less volatile after the crisis. 
Although we can learn some features of de facto exchange rate arrangements 
from the graphs to some extent, it is not so easy to infer the exact arrangements. 
Therefore, to infer the de facto exchange rate arrangements more precisely, we calculate 
the probability measures and the exchange rate flexibility index suggested by Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002). During the periods around the crisis, abnormal behaviors of these 
variables are observed as apparent from Figures 1, 2, and 3. Therefore, some months 
before and after the Asian crisis were dropped. For the post crisis-period, we use the 
sample period from 1999 while for the pre-crisis period, we cut the sample at the end of 
1996. To be more comparable to the sample size of the post crisis period, we start the 
sample as early as 1992. The exact estimation periods are summarized in Table 2. For all 
countries, the exchange rate against US dollar is used. The foreign exchange reserves in 
terms of US dollar are used because the exchange rate variations would change foreign 
exchange reserves in terms of domestic currency without any policy reactions.
8
                                                      
8 All data is from IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
  12  The benchmark cases for free floaters are Japan and Australia. Both countries are 
generally regarded as free floaters, and Japan is a good example of a free floater in East 
Asia. However, Japan’s currency is a world’s reserve currency. In addition, Japan is hard 
to be regarded as a small open economy that characterizes the countries in the sample. 
Therefore, following Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Australia is considered as a benchmark 
since Australia can be regarded as a small open economy and its currency is not usually 
used as international reserves. Estimation periods are 1983.1-2003.12 for Japan and 
1984.1-2003.12 for Australia, when they adopted a free float.
9
  The results are shown in Table 2. The first column shows the country name, the 
second estimation periods, the third de jure exchange rate arrangements, the fourth to the 
ninth the probability that the percentage changes in exchange rate, the percentage change 
in foreign exchange reserves, and the changes in interest rate are smaller than the 
threshold values of 2.5% and 1% respectively, and the last the exchange rate flexibility 
index (EFI).  
  In the two benchmark cases, Japan and Australia, the probability measures for the 
exchange rate and the interest rate are similar. The exchange rate changes less than 2.5% 
with 66~69% probability and less than 1% with 31~34% probability, while the interest 
rate changes less than 2.5% with 99~100% probability and less than 1% with 93~100% 
probability. The percent changes in foreign exchange reserves are more volatile in 
Australia than in Japan; the probabilities that the foreign exchange reserve changes less 
than 2.5% and 1% are 47.3% and 23.8% in Australia, while they are 80.5% and 55.0% in 
Japan. Since the volatility of the percentage changes in foreign exchange reserves is 
                                                      
9 The estimation periods are chosen based on IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  
  13higher in Australia while the volatility of the other two variables is similar, Australia 
seems to have a less flexible exchange rate arrangement than Japan. The exchange rate 
flexibility index is consistent with this observation. Japan has a higher value (0.80) than 
Australia (0.14), which suggests that the ratio of the volatility of the exchange rate to the 
policy instruments is higher in Japan than in Australia. This result might imply that a 
small open economy like Australia needed to implement a stronger magnitude of 
intervention to maintain a similar degree of volatility of exchange rate as Japan. 
Alternatively, it may be related to the fact that Japan’s currency has been used as an 
international reserve currency. 
  In the three countries that announced a fixed exchange rate regime in the post 
crisis period (Malaysia, Hong Kong, and China), the percentage changes in the exchange 
rate tend to be less volatile but the policy instrument changes tend to be more volatile. In 
general, their exchange rates are clearly fixed in the post crisis period and there is no 
further ambiguity on the exchange rate arrangements regardless of the volatility of the 
policy instruments. The EFI also drops from 0.37 to 0.00 in China and from 0.03 to 0.00 
in Malaysia, indicating the decrease in the exchange rate flexibility. 
  In the other five countries, the percentage changes in the exchange rate tend to be 
more volatile and the policy instruments changes tend to be less volatile in the post-crisis 
period than in the pre-crisis period. In Korea, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines, 
the probability for the exchange rate falls but the probability for the policy instruments 
increases. This implies that the volatility of the exchange rate changes increases, but the 
volatility of the policy instruments changes decreases, which in turn suggests more 
flexible exchange rate arrangements. In Indonesia, the inference is less clear because the 
  14probability for both exchange rate and interest rate decreases. On the other hand, based 
on the exchange rate flexibility index, the number increases in all countries in the post-
crisis regime, suggesting a more flexible exchange rate arrangement.  
  Overall, the exchange rate arrangements of the five East Asian countries that do 
not announce a fixed exchange rate regime in the post-crisis period tend to change toward 
a more flexible exchange rate regime in the post-crisis period. However, one important 
issue is whether there is “Fear of Floating,” that is, whether these countries, especially 
those that announced the flexible exchange rate regime in the post-crisis period, actually 
achieved the flexibility level which is close to a free float. In this regard, we compare the 
statistics of these countries with those of the two benchmark cases, Japan and Australia.  
  Based on the exchange rate flexibility index, all of these five countries achieved 
the level of the exchange rate flexibility of Australia, and some of them achieved the 
level of the exchange rate flexibility of Japan. The level of Australia is 0.14 and for the 
level of these six countries ranges from 0.26 to 2.82. In addition, Korea (1.37) and 
Indonesia (1.10~2.82) have even higher level than Japan (0.8). Singapore and Thailand 
(for 1999.1-2001.6) also achieved a similar level; the figures are 0.68 and 0.88, 
respectively.  
The probability measures are difficult to interpret since the results are often mixed 
in the sense that both the volatility of the exchange rate and the volatility of policy 
instruments are higher (or lower) than that of Japan and/or Australia. In the case of the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand, the exchange rate changes are less volatile than 
those in Japan but the policy instrument changes are more volatile than those of Japan. 
This suggests that the exchange rate flexibility is lower in these three countries than in 
  15Japan. On the other hand, the exchange rate flexibility of the Philippines is higher than 
that of Japan, based on the probability measures. For the other cases, results are mixed. In 
general, we cannot find clear evidence against the conclusion based on the exchange rate 
flexibility index: these five countries achieved the level of exchange rate flexibility 
comparable to that of Australia. This result also suggests that there is no case of clear 
“Fear of Floating” of East Asian countries in the post-crisis period, since they indeed 
achieved the level of exchange rate flexibility that is close to a free float. 
  Although the above results and inference are reasonable to some extent, there are 
a few cases suggesting that some of the results and inference might be misleading. For 
example, the managed float often shows higher exchange rate flexibility than the 
benchmark free float case: the exchange rate flexibility indexes for Singapore both in the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, China in the pre-crisis period, Thailand in the post-
crisis period and Indonesia in the pre-crisis period are higher than Australia. When we use 
the probability measures, such cases are found in several cases. Although we cannot fully 
dismiss the evidence based on Calvo and Reinhart (2002)’s measures based on this 
observation, some caution is needed. To confirm the main results in this section, we 
further investigate the issues, using the measures suggested by Kim (2004), which solves 
some drawbacks of Calvo and Reinhart (2002)’s method. 
 
3.3. De Facto Exchange Rate Arrangements: Kim (2004). 
In this section, we construct the measures developed by Kim (2004). In reporting 
the results, two types of estimates are constructed for the model with the exchange rate 
and the foreign exchange reserves; One is how many percentages of the foreign exchange 
  16reserve decrease (to stabilize the exchange rate) in reaction to one percent depreciation, 
and the other is how many percentages of the foreign exchange reserve “as a fraction of 
the average monetary base during the sample period” decrease in reaction to one percent 
depreciation.
10 This measure corrects a possible shortcoming of using simple percentage 
changes of reserves across different times and countries because the level of reserves may 
change over time and countries. For example, as apparent from Figure 2, East Asian 
countries accumulated a substantial amount of foreign exchange reserves over time, and 
the level of reserves are far higher in the post-crisis period than that was in the pre-crisis 
period. In that case, one percent change in foreign exchange reserves may have smaller 
effects on stabilizing the exchange rate in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis 
period, because one percent change in foreign exchange reserves implies smaller changes 
in the level of reserves in the post-crisis period than in the pre-crisis period. To correct 
such a bias, we calculate the reserve reactions as a ratio to monetary base. 
  The results are shown in Table 3. The first column shows the country name, the 
second estimation periods, the third de jure classification reported to IMF, the fourth to 
the sixth the reaction function of the foreign exchange reserves to the exchange rate (the 
first month, the third month, and the sixth month), the seventh to the ninth the reaction 
function of the foreign exchange reserves as a fraction of average monetary base and the 
tenth to the twelfth the reaction function of the interest rate to the exchange rate. Note 
that all the numbers of reaction functions are cumulative numbers over time. There are 
three cases in which the numbers are not reported; in two cases (Malaysia and China in 
the post crisis period), the exchange rate is literally fixed and the reaction functions 
                                                      
10 It is calculated by multiplying the original measure by the ratio of the average foreign exchange reserve 
to the average monetary base. 
  17cannot be estimated and in one case (Hong Kong), the data is not available. 
  First, we examine the benchmark countries. Japan’s foreign exchange reserve 
reactions show that the foreign exchange reserve decreases by 0.89% in the first month 
and by 0.86% at the end of the third and sixth months, in reaction to 1% exchange rate 
depreciation. The modified reactions (as a fraction of average monetary base) are about 
one-third of the actual foreign exchange reserve reactions, about 0.32~0.33%. The 
interest rate reactions show that the interest rate increases by 0.07~0.08% in reaction to 
1% exchange rate depreciation. Australia’s reaction function implies that more stabilizing 
policies were implemented, which is consistent with the results based on Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002)’s measures. The foreign exchange reaction as a fraction of average 
monetary base is about shows 1.7~1.88%, while the interest rate reactions are 
0.19~0.29%.  
  In one fixed exchange rate regime case (Hong Kong in the post-crisis period) that 
we could estimate the model, the policy reaction is huge; the foreign exchange reserve 
reaction ranges form –16.50 to –28.10%, the foreign exchange reserve reaction as a 
percentage of average monetary base ranges from –59.99 to –102.2%, and the interest 
rate reaction ranges from 5.27 to 6.25%. The result in general supports the method since 
we find far larger policy reactions in the fixed exchange rate regime than in the floating 
exchange rate regime, as expected. 
  Then, we examine the five countries that did not adopt the fixed exchange rate 
regime in the post-crisis period. For all five countries, a dramatic fall in the interest rate 
reactions is found after the crisis. In Korea, it is over 1% before the crisis but less than 
0.1% after the crisis. In Indonesia, it is over 3.5% but less than 0.5%. In the Philippines, it 
  18is over 1.3% but less than 0.4%. In Thailand, it is over 6.9% but less than 0.25%. In 
Singapore, it is over 0.55% but not larger than 0.2%. For Thailand and Indonesia, the 
foreign exchange reserve reaction also falls substantially; the size of the reactions falls to 
about one-third after the crisis in Thailand while it falls dramatically (to one tenth ~ one 
fiftieth) in Indonesia. For Korea and the Philippines, the reserve reaction falls 
substantially but the reserve reaction as a fraction of average monetary base does not 
change much. This reflects the substantial build-up of foreign exchange reserves after the 
crisis. An increase in foreign exchange reserves after the crisis is quite considerable, and 
in these two countries, it affects the inference on the relative size of the foreign exchange 
reserve reactions before and after the crisis. That is, based on the reserve reaction per se, 
the substantial decreases in the size of foreign exchange reserve reaction is found but 
based on the reserve reaction as a fraction of average monetary base, the size of reaction 
does not change much; the fall in the percentage of foreign exchange reserve reaction 
after the crisis is mostly due to an increase in the level of foreign exchange reserves 
instead of a decrease in the reaction of the foreign exchange reserve level. Finally, the 
reserve reactions do not change much in Singapore. 
  To summarize, these five countries actually took a more flexible exchange rate 
arrangement than they did before the crisis, to be consistent with the results in the 
previous section. Indonesia and Thailand decreased reactions of both foreign exchange 
reserves and the interest rate. In Korea, Indonesia, and Singapore, the foreign exchange 
reserve reaction shows mixed results but the interest rate reactions fall substantially. 
  Next, we compare the policy reactions of these five countries and the benchmark 
cases to infer whether these countries actually achieved the exchange rate flexibility that 
  19is close to a free float. All five countries’ reaction is stronger than Japan. Now we 
compare these countries with Australia in more details since the comparison result with 
Japan is trivial and so Australia may be a better benchmark for these countries as 
discussed previously. At least some countries should have achieved a similar degree of 
exchange rate flexibility to that of Australia. Korea has a lower degree of reserve and the 
interest rate reactions but a slightly higher degree of reserve reaction as a fraction of 
average monetary base. Indonesia has a lower degree of reserve reactions but a higher 
degree of interest rate reactions. Thailand also has a similar degree of reactions. In these 
countries, the size of reactions is not significantly different from that of Australia. On the 
other hand, the size of reactions of the Philippines is slightly higher than that of Australia, 
in terms of both the size of the foreign exchange reserve reactions as a fraction of 
monetary base and the size of interest rate reactions. In the case of Singapore, the size of 
the foreign exchange reserve reactions as a fraction of monetary base is substantially 
higher than that of Australia. Overall, at least three countries (Korea, Indonesia and 
Thailand) achieved a similar level of exchange rate flexibility to that of Australia.  
  When we compare the results of this section with those in the previous section 
using Calvo and Reinhart (2002)’s measure, many results are similar. One important 
discrepancy is how much degree of flexibility is achieved by the five Asian countries that 
did not adopt the fixed exchange rate regime in the post-crisis period (and mostly adopted 
the free float). The results based on Calvo and Reinhart (2002)’s method suggest that all 
these countries achieved as high degree of exchange rate flexibility as Australia and that 
some countries even achieved the level of Japan, while this section’s results suggest that 
all these countries did not achieve the level of Japan and that most countries achieved the 
  20level of Australia. That is, the results in this section are more conservative in terms of 
these five countries’ exchange rate flexibility. As one way of checking which methods 
and results are more convincing, we examine the level of reactions in the managed 
floating regimes, which Calvo and Reinhart (2002)’s method does not deliver convincing 
results. Contrary to the results using Calvo and Reinhart (2002)’s methods, the results 
using Kim (2004)’s methods seems to be more convincing in this aspect; based on Kim 
(2004)’s method, most countries that adopted a managed float have the larger size of 




We investigate the transition of the de facto exchange rate arrangements in East 
Asian countries and try to address various questions such as whether East Asian countries 
adopted more flexible exchange rate arrangements after the crisis, whether East Asian 
countries moved to the bi-polar regimes, and whether the level of exchange rate 
flexibility achieved by East Asian countries in the post-crisis period, especially those who 
announced a free float, are close to a free floater, by applying two methodologies, one 
suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and the other suggested by Kim (2004). 
  The results based on both methodologies present that East Asian countries (that 
did not adopt a peg in the post-crisis period) adopted a more flexible exchange rate 
arrangement after the crisis. Moreover many of these countries achieved the exchange 
rate flexibility close to a free floater such as Australia. In particular, the countries that 
announced a free float actually behave very closely to a free floater, dismissing the case 
  21of the “Fear of Floating” in the post crisis period. As they claim, East Asian countries 
tend to move to bi-polar regimes. Three out of the eight countries maintained a hard peg 
(currency board) or a peg with capital control while three or four countries moved to a 
free float. 
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  24Table 1. De Jure Exchange Rate Regime Classification 
Country  De Jure Exchange Rate Regime Classification 
Korea  1980.3-1997.12.15: Managed Floating 
1997.12.16 - : Independently Floating 
Indonesia  1978.11-1997.8.13: Managed Floating 
1997.8.14 – 2001.6.29: Independently Floating 
2001.6.30-: Managed Floating 
Philippines  1988.1 - : Independently Floating 
Malaysia  1992.12-1998.9.1: Managed Floating 
1998.9.2.-: Fixed 
Thailand  1970.1.-1997.7.1: Fixed 
1997.7.2.-2001.6.29: Independently Floating 
2001.6.30-: Managed Floating 
Hong Kong  1983.10.17-: Currency Board 
Singapore  1987 -: Managed Floating 
China  1987.8-1998.8: Managed Floating 
1998.9-: Fixed 
Japan  1982-: Independently Floating 









  25Table 2. Probability Measures and Exchange Rate Flexibility Index 




E FR  R E FR  R 
EFI
Japan   83.1-03.12  IF  66.9 80.5 100  33.1 55.0 99.2 0.80
Australia   84.1-03.12  IF  68.2 47.3 99.2 31.0 23.8 93.3 0.14
Korea  92.1-96.12  MF  100  55.9 93.2 88.1 27.1 61.0 0.05
  99.1-03.12  IF  81.4 62.7 100  42.4 33.9 100  1.37
Indonesia  92.1-96.12  MF  100  61.0 98.3 98.3 40.7 69.5 0.01
  99.1-01.6  IF  30.0 60.0 66.7 13.3 30.0 50.0 1.10
  01.7-03.12  MF  62.1 86.2 79.3 34.5 48.3 41.4 2.82
Philippines  92.1-96.12  IF  89.8 32.2 66.1 62.7 11.9 42.4 0.03
  99.1-03.12  IF  86.4 66.1 98.3 57.6 27.1 88.1 0.26
Malaysia   92.12-96.12 MF  91.7 50.0 100  72.9 27.1 100  0.03
  99.1-03.12 F  100 61.7  100 100 32.2  98.3  0.00
Thailand   92.1-96.12  F  100  72.9 78.0 98.3 30.5 30.5 0.02
  99.1-01.6  IF  74.3 80.0 97.1 37.1 42.9 88.6 0.88
  01.7-03.12  MF  96.6 75.9 100  51.7 20.7 100  0.30
Hong Kong  92.1-96.12  MF  91.5 ---  100  72.9 ---  100  --- 
  99.1-03.12 F  100 91.5  100 100 37.3  98.3  0.00
Singapore  92.1-96.12  MF  100  83.1 100  76.3 37.3 91.5 0.35
  99.1-03.12  MF  93.2 84.7 100  52.5 45.8 100  0.68
China  92.1-96.12  MF  96.6 35.6 100  91.5 11.9 94.9 0.37
  99.1-03.12 F  100 66.1  100 100 37.3  98.3  0.00
* F: Fixed, IF: Independently Floating, MF: Managed Floating 
* Monthly foreign exchange reserve data of Hong King is only available from 93.12 
* Monthly interest rate data of Hong Kong is not available for the pre-crisis period. 
  26Table 3. Policy Reaction Function (De Facto Classification) 
Reserve Reaction  Reserve Reaction (/MB)  Interest Rate Reactions  Country    Estimation
Periods 
De Jure
(IMF)  1 mo  3 mo  6 mo  1 mo  3 mo  6 mo  1 mo  3 mo  6 mo 
Japan   1983.1-2003.12                      IF -0.89 -0.86 -0.86 -0.33 -0.32 -0.32 0.08 0.07 0.07
Australia   1984.1-2003.12                      IF -2.23 -2.02 -2.01 -1.88 -1.70 -1.70 0.19 0.27 0.29
Korea   1992.1-1996.12                      MF -3.74 -3.17 -3.16 -3.30 -2.80 -2.79 1.68 1.12 1.06
  1999.1-2003.12                      IF -0.67 -0.91 -0.92 -2.62 -3.56 -3.62 0.07 0.09 0.10
Indonesia  1992.1-1996.12                MF -15.29 -19.14 -19.45 -19.62 -24.56 -24.96 4.06 3.71 3.70
  1999.1-2001.6                      IF -0.34 -0.26 -0.26 -0.74 -0.49 -0.48 0.48 0.46 0.46
                        2001.7-2003.12 MF -0.52 -0.60 -0.60 -0.95 -1.08 -1.08 0.55 0.38 0.33
Philippines   1992.1-1996.12                      IF -4.85 -4.19 -4.17 -3.57 -3.09 -3.06 2.70 1.53 1.36
  1999.1-2003.12                      IF -1.55 -1.39 -1.39 -2.55 -2.29 -2.28 0.28 0.35 0.36
Malaysia   1992.12-1996.12                MF -9.22 -18.08 -22.65 -14.29 -28.05 -35.13 1.56 1.06 1.02
  1999.1-2003.12                      F --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---






  27Table 3. Continues 
 
Reserve Reaction  Reserve Reaction (/MB)  Interest Rate Reactions  Country    Estimation
Periods 
De Jure
(IMF)  1 mo  3 mo  6 mo  1 mo  3 mo  6 mo  1 mo  3 mo  6 mo 
Thailand   1992.1-1996.12                      F -4.39 -3.95 -3.93 -10.01 -9.01 -8.96 6.99 8.21 8.21
  1999.1-2001.6                      IF -0.97 -0.60 -0.54 -2.05 -1.26 -1.13 0.22 0.24 0.24
                        2001.7-2003.12 MF -1.56 -1.46 -1.46 -3.25 -3.04 -3.05 0.14 0.09 0.07
Hong Kong   1992.1-1996.12                      MF --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
  1999.1-2003.12                F -16.50 -26.52 -28.10 -59.99 -96.44 -102.2 6.25 5.39 5.27
 Singapore  1992.1-1996.12                      MF -1.42 -1.28 -1.27 -7.57 -6.83 -6.79 0.60 0.57 0.57
  1999.1-2003.12                      MF -0.95 -1.20 -1.21 -7.07 -8.88 -8.96 0.20 0.18 0.18
China  1992.12-1996.12  MF                    -2.13 -2.58 -2.60 -0.52 -0.64 -0.64 0.06 0.06 0.06
  1999.1-2003.12                      F --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
 
IF: Independently Floating, MF: Managed Floating, F: Fixed 
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Figure 1. Exchange Rate
Japan
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Figure 2. Foreign Exchange Reserve
Japan
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Figure 3. Interest Rate
Japan
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